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Abstract
Rationale Hypothetical moral dilemmas, pitting characteristically utilitarian and non-utilitarian outcomes against each other,
have played a central role in investigations of moral decision-making. Preferences for utilitarian over non-utilitarian responses
have been explained by two contrasting hypotheses; one implicating increased deliberative reasoning, and the other implicating
diminished harm aversion. In recent field experiments, these hypotheses have been investigated using alcohol intoxication to
impair both social and cognitive functioning. These studies have found increased utilitarian responding, arguably as a result of
alcohol impairing affective empathy.
Objectives The present research expands existing investigations by examining the acute effects of alcohol on affective empathy
and subsequent moral judgments in traditional vignettes and moral actions in virtual reality, as well as physiological responses in
moral dilemmas.
Methods Participants (N = 48) were administered either a placebo or alcohol in one of two dosages; low or moderate. Both pre- and
post intervention, participants completed amoral action andmoral judgment task alongside behavioural measures of affective empathy.
Results Higher dosages of alcohol consumption resulted in inappropriate empathic responses to facial displays of emotion,
mirroring responses of individuals high in trait psychopathy, but empathy for pain was unaffected. Whilst affective empathy
was influenced by alcohol consumption in a facial responding task, both moral judgments and moral actions were unaffected.
Conclusions These results suggest that facets, beyond or in addition to deficits in affective empathy, might influence the
relationship between alcohol consumption and utilitarian endorsements.
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Introduction
Traditionally, provocative moral dilemmas, pitting characteristi-
cally utilitarian versus deontological ideologies against each
other, have played a central role in the investigation of moral
judgment (e.g. Bartels et al. 2015; Cushman et al. 2010). For
example, in the switch dilemma, individuals must decide wheth-
er to flick a switch, redirecting a trolley car to kill one worker on
the tracks instead of five (Thomson 1976). Alternatively, in the
footbridge dilemma, individuals must decide whether to push a
large person in front of the trolley, in order to stop it from killing
the five workers on the tracks (Foot 1978). This ‘trolley prob-
lem’ has generated interest as individuals tend to give the typi-
cally consequentialist or utilitarian judgment (they judge that
maximising the number of lives saved is morally acceptable)
in the switch case, but refuse to do so in a characteristically
deontological sense (harm is wrong and the ends do not justify
the means) in the footbridge case (Thomson 1976).
Several theories have attempted to understand these diver-
gent responses given their structural similarity in entailing the
five-for-one trade-off (Thomson 1976). Greene’s dual process
model of moral judgment (Greene et al. 2001) distinguishes
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between ‘personal’ dilemmas like the footbridge and ‘imper-
sonal’ dilemmas such as the switch. Personal dilemmas are
those ‘involving actions that are (a) likely to cause serious
bodily harm, (b) to a particular person, where (c) this harm
does not result from deflecting an existing threat onto a dif-
ferent party’ (Greene et al. 2001, p. 2107). These dilemmas are
thought to trigger an emotional and aversive response; an
‘alarm bell’ associated with emotional systems in the brain
(Cushman et al. 2010, p. 50) resulting in a deontological or
non-utilitarian response (i.e. refusing to endorse harmful ac-
tions). In the absence of this negative alarm bell in impersonal
dilemmas, the utilitarian option dominates the response, driv-
en by increased activations in brain areas associated with con-
trolled cognitive processes (Greene et al. 2001).
Greene’s model has received attention across many research
domains, with a strong body of research supporting the theory
that deliberative reasoning results in greater utilitarian moral
judgments (e.g. Greene et al. 2008; Greene et al. 2004; Greene
et al. 2001; Koenigs et al. 2007). However, the proposed link
between utilitarian responses and increased reasoning has also
been challenged (e.g. Kahane et al. 2015) with research suggest-
ing that increased utilitarian preference may, instead, derive
from a decreased aversion to harming others as a result of def-
icits in social processing (Patil 2015). For example, research
suggests that the increased ‘utilitarianism’ found in psychopath-
ic populations, results from deficits in affective empathy1
(Bartels and Pizarro 2011; Djeriouat and Tremoliere 2014;
Gao and Tang 2013). In fact, recent investigations of moral
actions in virtual reality trolley problems have found a positive
association between psychopathic traits and utilitarian actions
(Francis et al. 2016) and the strength of these actions (Francis
et al. 2017b). These actions were also negatively associated with
traits inversely related to psychopathy such as Honesty-
Humility (sincerity, fairness, greed avoidance, and modesty).
Support for this social processing hypothesis can also be found
in pharmacological studies; Citalopram (a drug that enhances
serotonin and subsequent pro-social behaviour) enhanced non-
utilitarian moral responses (Crockett et al. 2010), whilst in-
creased levels of testosterone (Carney and Mason 2010) and
increased levels of anger (e.g. Choe and Min 2011) have been
associated with increased utilitarian responses.
One way in which research has sought to investigate the
relationship between social and cognitive functioning in moral
decision-making is to study populations impaired in affective
empathy and higher-order cognitive abilities. Previous research
has examined individuals with deficits in emotional processing
either as a result of brain lesions (e.g. Ciaramelli et al. 2007),
neurological disorders (e.g. Mendez et al. 2005), or alcohol and
drug dependence (Carmona-Perera et al. 2014; Carmona-Perera
et al. 2013; Khemiri et al. 2012). To date, there have been few
investigations of the acute effects of alcohol onmoral judgments
made in response to hypothetical moral dilemmas. In a recent
study, Duke and Begue (2015) examined acute effects of blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) on moral decision-making in par-
ticipants recruited at bars in France. Across two studies, they
found that BAC levels were positively correlated with utilitarian
preferences in response to the footbridge dilemma and that this
effect was not mediated by self-reported feelings of behavioural
disinhibition or self-reported positive mood.
The finding that acute alcohol consumption promotes utili-
tarian moral judgments in response to personal moral dilemmas
supports previous research examining moral decision-making
in alcohol-dependent individuals (Carmona-Perera et al. 2014;
Khemiri et al. 2012). These studies have found that prolonged
effects of alcohol dependence result in greater utilitarian moral
judgments as a result of affective processing deficits.2 Crucially,
these findings are in contention with Greene’s dual process
model which would argue that alcohol intoxication triggers
emotional reactivity and impaired higher-order functioning,
which in turn prompts increased non-utilitarian moral judg-
ments (Greene et al. 2001). Duke and Begue (2015) argue that,
instead, their finding implicates a strong role for impaired social
cognition in predicting utilitarian preferences. Alcohol intoxi-
cation results in a ‘ … decreased capacity for empathy’ or more
specifically, decreased aversion to harming others which sub-
sequently promotes the utilitarian option (Duke and Begue
2015, p. 125). However, affective empathy was not explicitly
measured in this paradigm. From a broader perspective, the
theory that alcohol intoxication produces utilitarian responses
as a result of impaired affective empathy is consistent with the
connection between utilitarianism and certain deficits in social
functioning as a result of brain damage (e.g. Koenigs et al.
2007) and psychopathic traits (e.g. Patil 2015).
Few studies have investigated both cognitive and affective
empathy in alcohol-dependent individuals specifically
(Thoma et al. 2013). Of the few that have examined this, some
argue that impairments in premorbid trait empathy compro-
mise social functioning, leading to more social problems,
which could then predispose individuals to use alcohol as a
coping strategy (Thoma et al. 2013). In terms of distinctions
between affective and cognitive empathy in these individuals,
several studies have found that affective empathy is principal-
ly impaired in alcohol-dependent individuals (Maurage et al.
1 Given that ‘empathy’ encompasses a variety of related phenomena (Decety
and Cowell 2015), here we investigate the affective components of empathy
specifically and define affective empathy as ‘...the generation of an appropriate
emotional reaction in response to others’ emotions’ (Feshbach, 1978; 1987 as
adopted by and cited in Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012).
2 The psychopharmacological effects of alcohol consumption are not reviewed
in length here as alcohol has several mechanisms of action on the central nervous
system (Carlson 2010); alcohol produces a complex effect that is mediated by
distinct receptor systems that are not evenly amplified with ethanol dosage
(Stoleman 2010). For example, among other effects, alcohol facilitates GABA
transmission, inhibits glutamatergic transmission, and increases serotonin trans-
mission (Stoleman 2010). Each of these prompts and mediates various anxiolyt-
ic, sedative, stimulant, and reinforcing effects (Carlson 2010).
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2011; Marinkovic et al. 2009) and addicted patients more
broadly (Ferrari et al. 2014). Whilst recent research has found
that acute alcohol consumption reduces empathic neural ac-
tivity for pain (Hu et al. 2017), the specific effects of acute
alcohol intake on affective empathy have yet to be investigat-
ed. This is particularly important following suggestions that
deficits in affective empathy mediate the relationship between
alcohol consumption and utilitarian moral decision-making
(Duke and Begue 2015).
Addressing limitations
The quasi-experimental setup adopted by Duke and Begue
(2015) raises questions regarding the influence of social atmo-
sphere, potential social awareness, and uncontrolled alcohol
dosages on moral decision-making. The present experiment
addressed these limitations through a laboratory-controlled
study, examining the effects of low and moderate dosages of
alcohol consumption on moral judgments and moral actions.
Whilst the research by Duke and Begue (2015) may have shed
further light on the role of social deficits on utilitarian moral
judgments, research has yet to investigate similar manipula-
tions within the domain of moral action. This is significant
given evidence of a disparity between moral judgments given
in response to text-based vignettes and moral actions simulat-
ed in virtual trolley problems (e.g. Francis et al. 2016; Francis
et al. 2017b; Francis et al. 2017a; McDonald et al. 2017; Patil
et al. 2014). With previous research in this area supporting an
association between moral actions and personality traits asso-
ciated with diminished harm aversion (e.g. Francis et al. 2016;
Francis et al. 2017b; Tassy et al. 2013a), exploring the effects
of a diminished capacity to process social cues seems highly
relevant in the domain of moral action. The present experi-
ment was also adapted to include behavioural assessments of
affective empathy and harm aversion in an attempt to shed
light on the relationship between these traits and moral deci-
sion-making, beyond that of questionnaire assessments which
can be confounded by social desirability responding.
Specific hypotheses
Moral responses
If existing research examining acute effects of alcohol (Duke
and Begue 2015) and alcohol dependence (Carmona-Perera
et al. 2014) on moral judgments in personal moral dilemmas
(such as the footbridge dilemma) is supported, increased utili-
tarian preferences may be observed. If this relationship is influ-
enced by deficits in social processing and reduced aversion to
harm, performance in behavioural affective empathy tasks
should decrease following alcohol consumption and this
decline should be associated with utilitarian preferences in re-
sponse to well-knownmoral vignettes (taken fromGreene et al.
(2001)). If, on the other hand, existing dual process models of
moral judgment can be supported, then alcohol consumption
might lead to increased preference for non-utilitarian moral
judgments as a result of increased emotional reactivity and de-
creased cognitive functioning (Greene et al. 2001).
Predictions regarding simulated moral actions in a virtual
reality version of the footbridge dilemma (used in Francis
et al. (2016)) are less certain. Given previous research demon-
strating the link between utilitarian moral actions and traits
associated with reduced affective empathy and less aversion
to harm (e.g. Francis et al. 2016; Francis et al. 2017b; Patil
2015; Tassy et al. 2013a), alcohol intoxication may result in
greater utilitarian actions if affective empathy is diminished in
behavioural measures of affective empathy. However, the lat-
ter hypothesis supporting Greene’s dual process model may
also stand if existing models apply to the domain of moral
action (e.g. Navarrete et al. 2012). In the present investigation,
heart rate sampling was completed with the primary aims of
assessing whether arousal was modality or moral specific (as
in Francis et al. 2016) and, in this experiment specifically, to
determine whether blood alcohol level affected physiological
arousal in response to moral scenarios.
Affective empathy
Self-reported valence (i.e. attraction or aversion) towards fa-
cial displays of emotion has been used as a measure of affec-
tive empathy (Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012). In the present in-
vestigation, personality traits were assessed to investigate their
relationship with these behavioural measures of affective em-
pathy, allowing validation of these behavioural approaches
(Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012). If behavioural assessments pro-
vide a valid measure of trait affective empathy, performance in
them is expected to inversely relate to primary psychopathy, as
shown in previous research (Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012).3 In
contrast, performance should positively correlate with existing
trait assessments of affective empathy including Empathic
Concern, a facet of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI)
(Davis 1983), one of the longest used measures of empathy.
Both Honesty-Humility, a trait relevant to reciprocal altruism
(Ashton et al. 2014) thought to capture elements of empathic
concern (Brick and Lewis 2016), as well as trait assessments
of moral identity, should be positively associated with these
behavioural assessments given that affective empathy,
Honesty-Humility, and moral identity (internalisation) are
thought to be connected facets of moral character relating to
the consideration of others (Cohen et al. 2014; Cohen and
3 Self-reported valence towards happy faces was negatively predicted by psy-
chopathy, with valence towards sad faces showing the inverse effect (Ali et al.
2009; Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012).
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Panter 2015).4 Previous research has also adopted empathy for
pain tasks as a means of assessing affective responses to the
pain of others (Decety and Jackson 2004; Jackson et al. 2005).
If these provide a valid assessment of empathy for pain, re-
duced empathy for harm might be observed in individuals
scoring higher in psychopathy and associated traits based on
previous research (Bartels and Pizarro 2011; Patil 2015).
The second purpose of these behavioural affective empathy
tasks was to provide a baseline with which to compare perfor-
mances in post-intervention empathy tasks following alcohol
consumption. If acute alcohol intake does affect social pro-
cessing, by reducing the capacity for affective empathy and
decreasing harm aversion, then alcohol consumption is ex-
pected to reduce performance in these behavioural measures
of affective empathy. Self-reported valence towards happy
and sad faces and self-reported empathy towards painful im-
ages may be reduced as a result of impaired social processing
and emotional blunting (Duke and Begue 2015). For facial
displays of emotion specifically, self-reported valences fol-
lowing alcohol consumption may mirror the inappropriate re-
sponses given by individuals scoring high in psychopathy
(Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012).
Method
Participants
The present sample size was based on previous research
(Duke and Begue 2015). Fifty participants comprising 33 fe-
males and 17males (Mage = 21.60, SD = 4.65 years, age range
18–42 years, ethnicity: 89.58% Caucasian, 6.25% Mixed/
multiple ethnic groups, 2.08% Asian British, 2.08% Black
African) were recruited from the Plymouth University,
School of Psychology student participant pool and participat-
ed for course credit. All participants were students enrolled on
a psychology course at the university. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision and the majority of par-
ticipants were right-handed (84.1%). Two participants were
excluded from the experiment; one having failed to see clearly
in the non-moral virtual task as a result of vision problems and
one having failed to complete the non-moral virtual task due
to lack of understanding. As such, 48 participants comprising
31 females and 17 males (Mage = 21.44, SD = 4.63 years, age
range 18–42 years) formed the final sample. All participants
met inclusion criteria; they were not alcohol-naïve, not suffer-
ing from panic or anxiety attacks, not taking prescription med-
ication that would be affected by alcohol consumption, they
had no personal or family history of alcohol dependence, they
did not report significant psychological problems, they were
not pregnant or expecting to become pregnant, and they had
not experienced aversive allergic reactions to alcohol con-
sumption in the past. This research received ethical approval
from the Plymouth University Ethics Committee.
Experimental design
Participants were randomly assigned to one of three condi-
t ions: placebo (N = 16, 10 females and 6 males
(Mage = 22.13, SD = 6.43 years); low alcohol (N= 16, 10
females and 6 males (Mage = 20.06, SD = 2.82 years); high
alcohol (N= 16, 11 females and 5 males (Mage = 22.13, SD =
3.91 years). A mixed-model design was adopted to examine
whether there were differences between groups of individuals
who consumed varying dosages of alcohol (placebo; low al-
cohol; high alcohol) across a set of repeated measures tasks
(behavioural measures of affective empathy; moral decision-
making measures). The main outcome measures were behav-
ioural measures of affective empathy scores (self-reported va-
lence to facial displays of emotion; self-reported intensity of
pain pictured in images) before and after alcohol consump-
tion, moral responses (moral actions simulated in a virtual
moral dilemma; moral judgments in a text-based moral dilem-
ma), and heart rate responses in both a virtual reality and text-
based moral dilemma (see Fig. 1).
Secondary measures included personality trait assessments
(to examine their relationship to responses in the behavioural
measures of affective empathy prior to alcohol consumption)
and manipulation checks and various control measures (of
which full analyses can be found in the Supplementary
Material).
Personality measures
Prior to the experiment, participants were asked to fill out an
electronic questionnaire comprising four self-report measures:
The Levenson Self-Report Psychopathy Scale (LSRP)
(Levenson et al. 1995) is a self-report measure of psy-
chopathy intended for research purposes. It has a two-
factor structure assessing both primary psychopathic
traits (16 items, e.g. selfishness) and secondary psycho-
pathic traits (10 items, e.g. impulsivity) in non-
institutionalised populations (αs = .72–.84). The scale
contains 26 items total, rated on a 4-point Likert scale
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree). The
scale includes items such as ‘For me, what’s right is what-
ever I can get away with’.
The Hexaco-60 (Ashton and Lee 2009) is a personality
inventory designed to assess six dimensions of personal-
ity. The inventory assesses the characteristics of Honesty-
Humility (items 10), Emotionality (items 10),
Extraversion (items 10), Agreeableness (items 10),
4 Given their focus on the welfare of others, these traits are also inversely
associated with primary psychopathy (Glenn et al. 2010; Lee and Ashton
2014).
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Conscientiousness (items 10), and Openness to experi-
ence (items 10) (αs = .79–.82).5 The inventory contains
60 items with responses given on a 5-point Likert scale
(from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). The
inventory contains items such as ‘I wouldn’t pretend to
like someone just to get that person to do favours for me’.
The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis 1983) is an
inventory designed to measure dispositional empathy. It
contains four subscales to measure Perspective Taking,
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Fantasy
(αs = .72–.84). Perspective Taking is thought to relate to
cognitive empathy whilst Empathic Concern is thought to
relate to affective empathy. Personal Distress is often seen
as a distinct conceptualisation to empathy (e.g. Batson
2009; Decety and Moriguchi 2007) and is included as a
measure of ‘...self-oriented, egoistic’ reactions (Decety and
Moriguchi 2007, p.17). The Fantasy subscale measures
tendencies to relate to the feelings of fictitious characters.
The inventory contains 28 items with responses
given on a 5-point Likert scale (from A = Does
not describe me well to E = Describes me very
well). The scale contains items such as ‘I am often
quite touched by things that I see happen’.
The Self-Importance of Moral Identity Scale (Aquino
and Reed 2002) provides a measure of moral identity.
It contains two subscales that assess symbolisation
(i.e. public dimension of moral identity) (5 items;
α = .69) and internalisation (i.e. private dimension of
moral identity) (5 items; α = .87). The inventory con-
tains 10 items with responses given on a 5-point
Likert scale (from A =Does not describe me well to
E =Describes me very well). The scale contains items
such as ‘It would make me feel good to be a person
who has these characteristics’.
Behavioural measures of affective empathy
In the present experiment, additional behavioural measures of
affective empathywere included. These were completed by all
participants pre- and post-intervention in a counterbalanced
order:
Facial task In an attempt to assess affective empathy, the Self-
Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Bradley and Lang 1994) as-
sesses an individual’s response to emotional stimuli rather
than relying on self-report questionnaires. Adopting a proce-
dure similar to that used in previous research (Wai and
Tiliopoulos 2012), images depicting specific facial expres-
sions (happy, sad, and neutral) were presented to participants
(see Fig. 2). These images were sampled from the Montreal
Set of Facial Displays of Emotion (MSFDE) (Beaupré et al.
2000) and comprised eight images per emotion, gender-
balanced, and comprising only Caucasian faces. All im-
ages were presented in the same size and in greyscale.
Following presentation, participants were asked to indicate
how they felt towards the face on the SAM valence scale
(1 (negative)–9 (positive)). In the pre-intervention task,
four images of each emotion were presented to partici-
pants with the remaining 50% of images presented during
the post-intervention task to prevent carryover effects.
Pain task The empathy for pain paradigm included in the
present experiment has been adopted in previous research as
a means of assessing affective responses when perceiving the
pain of others (Jackson et al. 2005) and has been argued to be a
5 The HEXACO scale was minimised to the Honesty-Humility (α = .79) and
Agreeableness (α = .82) facets. Agreeableness was also included in the present
investigation given its inverse association with anger and aggression (Ashton
and Lee 2007); states also associated with alcohol consumption (Giancola
2004).
Pre: Responses to facial 
displays of emoon
Pre-Test:
Behavioural Measures of 
Affective Empathy
Post-Test:
Behavioural Measures of 
Affective Empathy
Moral decision-making 
measures
Moral acons and heart rate 
in virtual moral dilemma 
Moral judgments and heart 
rate in text-based moral 
dilemma 
Post: Responses to facial 
displays of emoon
Pre: Responses to painful or 
neutral images
Post: Responses to painful or 
neutral images
Alcohol
Fig. 1 Primary outcome measures in experimental sequence. Alcohol is consumed (at varying dosages) after the first set of behavioural measures of
affective empathy are completed. Note that each participant completes all of the tasks displayed (repeated measures variables)
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way of investigating the processes involved in empathy
(Decety and Jackson 2004). Adopting procedures from previ-
ous research (e.g. Jackson et al. 2005), images of hands and
feet in painful and neutral conditions were presented to
individuals (see Fig. 3). Following this, participants
were asked to indicate on a visual analogue scale
(VAS) (0 (no pain)–10 (worse pain ever)) the intensity
of pain they thought the person in the image would feel
in that situation. Our image group, sampled from an
existing set (Jackson et al. 2005), comprised 18 painful
images of familiar events and 18 neutral counterparts of
the same events taken at ‘… angles that promoted first-
person perspective’ (Jackson et al. 2005, p. 772). The
types of pain included in these images were mechanical,
thermal, and pressure-related with individuals in the im-
ages varying in both gender and age. All images were
displayed in the same size and in colour. In the pre-
intervention task, nine of the neutral and nine of the
painful images were presented to participants with the
remaining images presented during the post-intervention
task to prevent carryover effects.
The presentation of facial displays of emotion and pain
image blocks was counterbalanced across participants in both
the pre-intervention and post-intervention completion of the
tasks. No image was displayed more than once throughout the
whole experiment.
Moral decision-making measures
All participants completed a non-moral and moral action task
and a non-moral and moral judgment task, both taken from
Francis et al. (2016). For the action tasks, participants were
presented with virtual reality scenarios using a head-mounted
display (Oculus Rift 2). In the non-moral and moral virtual
tasks, participants were given verbal instructions informing
them that they would have the opportunity to engage with a
virtual object using a joystick. Participants first completed the
non-moral virtual task which involved pushing a virtual object
(3D shape) upon hearing a tone. This task allowed a baseline
measure of heart rate change to be collected (see physiological
measures). It also allowed us to determine if changes in arous-
al in the subsequent virtual moral task were attributable to
modality or moral content (Francis et al. 2016). For the moral
action task, participants were presented with an audio-visual
virtual reconstruction of the footbridge dilemma. The dilem-
ma played out in real-time as described in Foot (1978) with the
participant standing on a footbridge behind a large person.
The scene was displayed in first person view. In the scenario,
a modern train railcar approached from behind the participant,
towards five virtual human agents standing on the tracks in
front of the participant. Participants would have to decide
whether to push the large person off the footbridge to stop
the railcar’s progress or to allow the railcar to continue and
(a) (b)
Fig. 3 Example of painful stimuli (a) and non-painful stimuli (b) (Jackson et al. 2005)
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2 Example of neutral (a), sad (b), and happy (c) expression stimuli (Beaupré et al. 2000)
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kill the people standing on the track ahead. The following
audio descriptions were played to participants within the vir-
tual environment:
1. 30s: ‘Look behind you, a train is coming’.
2. 55s: ‘Hey I am too far away but if you want to save the
people you could push the large person on to the tracks
and derail the train. If you’re going to push them, do it
now, but it is your choice’.
As in previous studies (see Francis et al. 2016; Francis et al.
2017a), participants were given 10 s to respond in the dilem-
ma (by choosing to push with the joystick or by choosing to
do nothing).
For the judgment task, participants were given a non-moral
sample vignette to read which contained instructions
displayed in the format of the pending dilemmas. Given that
participants were completing both the moral action and moral
judgment task, a validated6 and comparable moral dilemma to
the footbridge dilemma was used in moral judgment task (see
Francis et al. 2017a). This comparable moral dilemma was
matched to the footbridge across the moral principles of ben-
efit-recipient, inevitability, moral magnitude, physical contact,
and personal force. This dilemma was embedded in nine
distracter dilemmas; five were classified as personal and four
as impersonal and were selected from those originally used in
Greene et al. (2001). All dilemmas were presented electroni-
cally in a random order. As in previous studies (Francis et al.
2016; Francis et al. 2017b; Francis et al. 2017a), after each
dilemma, participants were asked a morality question (‘Is it
morally acceptable to [specific to the scenario]?’). After a
response was given, a second behavioural question was
displayed asking (‘Would you do it?’).7 Participants
responded by selecting ‘Yes’ (Y- key) or ‘No’ (N- key) and
these were then coded as utilitarian (yes) or non-utilitarian
(no).
Physiological measures
Alcohol In order to assess and monitor the effects of alcohol in
the low and high alcohol conditions, estimated blood alcohol
levels (% BAC) were taken at specific intervals during the
experiment from each participant’s breath air, using a portable
breathalyser device (AlcoSense Pro Breathalyser and Alcohol
Tester) utilised by UK police forces. The breathalyser mea-
sures the concentration of alcohol vapour in a single breath.
Moral decision-making tasks Heart rate was recorded using
the equipment and procedure adopted in Francis et al.
(2016). A Cateye-PL-6000 heart rate monitor was attached
to participants via an ear clip. As outlined in previous re-
search, heart rate change (bpm) can be both abrupt and gradual
(Francis et al. 2016) and so heart rate readings were taken at
the onset and offset of all non-moral and moral tasks. The
duration between onset and offset of tasks was dependent on
the task type (non-moral; moral) and was determined by read-
ing speed in the judgment tasks (see Francis et al. 2016 for a
full description of this sampling procedure). Heart rate sam-
pling was completed with the primary aims of assessing
whether arousal was modality or moral specific.8
Procedure
Pre-intervention Prior to arriving at the experiment, partici-
pants were reminded to refrain from drinking alcoholic bev-
erages within 12 h of the experiment beginning. All conditions
first completed the personality trait assessments, a pre-
questionnaire assessing their gaming experience (weekly
hours of video game playing and number of times playing
games annually) and a subjective mood visual analogue scale
(100 mm long) assessing disinhibition and positive affect
(Duke and Begue 2015). Participants then completed the be-
havioural measures of affective empathy. Participants were
seated 50 cm away from a PC. At the beginning of the task,
a resting slide appeared on-screen and participants were
instructed to look at the fixation cross at the centre of the
screen. Sixty seconds from the onset of the resting slide, the
first stimulus appeared. Following an existing procedure
(Partala and Surakka 2003), each image stimulus was present-
ed for 6 s. After image offset, the relevant scale was presented
for 8 s to be completed by participants (SAM valence scale for
facial displays of emotion or VAS for pain images).
Participants used the computer mouse with their right hand
to select a rating along the given scale. Following scale offset,
a blank slide with a fixation cross would be displayed for a
randomised interval of 10–15 s before the next image stimulus
was delivered to prevent anticipation of stimuli (see Fig. 4).
Following completion of the pre-intervention behavioural
6 See Francis et al. (2017a) supporting information for validation studies; two
experiments with qualitatively different populations found no differences in
responses to the footbridge dilemma and the matched dilemma.
7 Whilst previous research has examined action-choice questions (behavioural
question) as distinct from judgment questions (morality question), both of
these remain self-reported moral judgments with a behavioural question only
being ‘…what the participants think their action could be if they were to make
the decision in real life’ (Tassy et al. 2013b, p. 2). Whereas, virtual reality
offers the opportunity to present dynamic environments in which researchers
can investigate theoretical and normative decisions in the framework of moral
action (Navarrete et al. 2012) in whichwe can askwhether someone would ‘…
actually resort to this course of action when the full repertoire of contextual
features comes into play?’ (Patil et al. 2014, p. 95).
8 Although previous research has investigated arousal as a predictor of moral
decisions in virtual dilemmas (Navarrete et al. 2012; Patil et al. 2014), in the
present paradigm, heart rate change also incorporates the time in which par-
ticipants witness the consequences of their actions. Given that we measure
arousal beyond decision-making, we do not investigate predictions of moral
actions from heart rate change in the present experiment (Francis et al. 2016).
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measures of affective empathy, participants were given an
additional questionnaire to complete which assessed their al-
cohol consumption (units per week) and their current weight
(kg).9 Participants were then randomly allocated to one of the
three conditions: placebo, low alcohol, or high alcohol. An
estimate baseline BAC was then taken (participants were
asked to blow into a sterile tube attached to the portable
breathalysing device).
Intervention In an attempt to reach target BAC levels
predefined in existing research and subsequently shown to
affect moral decision-making: 0.038–0.04% (Duke and
Begue 2015), the high alcohol condition received 0.80 g/kg
vodka (37.5% alcohol by volume). The low alcohol condition
received a dose of 0.40 g/kg vodka (37.5% alcohol by vol-
ume) to produce lower BAC levels, allowing a systematic
investigation of the effect (if present) across a range of BAC
levels. All alcoholic drinks were mixed with two-part lemon-
ade and were flavoured with fresh lime juice. Participants in
the placebo condition were given lemonade flavoured with
lime and alcohol was sprayed around the edge of the glass in
order to provide an alcohol odour, ensuring that condition
assignment was unknown. Alcohol expectancy has been
shown to influence social behaviours (e.g. Assefi and Garry
2003) by providing an excuse for individuals to engage in
inhibited social behaviours and the ability to justify these be-
haviours. Given these expectancy effects, additional alcohol
cues such as floating a small amount of alcohol on top of each
placebo glass (e.g. Roberts et al. 2012) were not adopted here
to avoid participant expectation confounding task perfor-
mance. The aim of this manipulation was to ensure that con-
dition assignment was unknown and not to deceive placebo
participants into accepting that they had consumed alcohol. In
all conditions, participants were given 10 min to consume the
beverage. In order to control for awareness of condition as-
signment, an awareness check was performed asking partici-
pants whether they knew which condition they had been as-
signment to and if so, how they knew. A waiting period of
20 min followed in order for alcohol to be absorbed into the
blood and to reach a predefined optimal level.10 Following
this, a second BAC reading was taken (estimated peak BAC).
Post-intervention All participants completed a second subjec-
tive mood assessment of disinhibition and positive affect,
followed by the moral action and judgment tasks. The order
of the moral tasks was counterbalanced. Participants then
completed the post-intervention behavioural measures of af-
fective empathy using a procedure identical to that of the pre-
intervention behavioural measures of affective empathy.
9 This questionnaire also assessed exclusion criteria for the present experiment
including alcohol naivety, alcohol dependence (including that of family mem-
bers), and current medication use. These criteria had been outlined to partici-
pants prior to signing up to the experiment but were also included during the
experiment as a precautionary measure.
Resng slide 
60s
SAM valence scale
or
VAS 
8s
Facial image 
or 
Pain image
6s
Blank Slide
10-15s
+
+
Fig. 4 Experimental procedure in
behavioural measures of affective
empathy (facial and pain tasks).
The same procedure was adopted
in both the pre-intervention and
post-intervention behavioural
measures of affective empathy
10 Peak BAC was estimated using previous research (Mitchell Jr. et al. 2014)
and initial pilot testing; participants (N = 7,Mage = 27.72, 3 females, 4 males)
who consumed alcohol at low and high dosage reached peak BAC between
approximately 20–40 min. All participants receiving the low or high alcohol
dosages reached the target BAC levels in this time frame (low, 0.01%; high,
0.04%).
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Following completion of this task, a final estimate BAC read-
ing was taken. Participants were invited to leave the experi-
ment after their BAC level had returned to a predetermined
limit (< 0.01%).
Statistical analysis
Given the mixed model experimental design adopted here,
primary outcome measures were analysed as follows:
Moral responses and alcohol
In order to compare moral judgments and moral actions, sim-
ulated moral actions in the virtual version of the footbridge
dilemma were compared with the moral judgments made in
response to the text-based counterpart. Given that responses to
the moral judgment task and moral action task were binary
(yes/utilitarian; no/non-utilitarian), generalised estimating
equations (GEE) were performed using a binary logistic mod-
el with task (judgment task; action task) as within-subjects
factor and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as
between-subjects factor. Two analyses were carried out, the
first using the morality question in the judgment task and the
second using the behavioural question in the judgment task.
This analysis was designed to compare moral actions in virtual
reality andmoral judgments in text-based vignettes; hence, the
morality and behavioural questions were referenced in sepa-
rate analyses (as both are self-reported judgment deriving
from the same text-based moral dilemma). Generalized esti-
mating equations (GEE) are an extension of generalized linear
models (GZLM). Like GZLM, it allows analysis of scale,
count, or binary responses (residuals can follow a non-
normal distribution) but also allows analysis of repeated mea-
sures variables (or more broadly, correlated observations)
which GZLM does not. Given that GEE enable analysis of
binary responses and repeated measures variables, it is used
here to analyse binary moral responses (utilitarian; non-
utilitarian) across the repeated measures moral decision-
making tasks (virtual moral dilemma; text-based moral dilem-
ma) in the three alcohol groups (placebo; low alcohol; high
alcohol). This analysis has been used in previous research
comparing moral action and judgment in the same individuals
(Francis et al. 2017a). Given that these analyses are dealing
with binary data, Cohen’s h is included as a measure of effect
size as it concerns the difference between two proportions and
the same rules of thumb for interpreting the size of Cohen’s d
apply to Cohen’s h.
Heart rate and alcohol
In all groups, changes in heart rate were calculated by
subtracting the heart rate readings (bpm) taken at the offset of
the moral (and non-moral) tasks from those taken at the onset of
the moral (and non-moral task) tasks. Heart rate changes were
analysed using a mixed model ANOVA although the ratio of
the greatest and least variance in heart rate change was > 3 and
as such, this analysis was repeated, and findings replicated
using generalised estimating equations, which does not assume
homogeneity of variance (see Supplementary Material).
Note that additional analyses were performed for these pri-
mary outcome measures to examine the relationship between
individual differences in alcohol absorption and moral re-
sponses and individual differences in alcohol absorption and
heart rate changes.
Alcohol and behavioural measures of affective
empathy
Facial task The SAM was used to assess self-reported valence
to facial emotions and subsequent affective empathy (Wai and
Tiliopoulos 2012). Valence scores were calculated by averag-
ing self-reported valence scores (1 (negative)–9 (positive))
across each emotion set of facial expressions (neutral; happy;
sad) for the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests (see
Supplementary Material for descriptive statistics).
Pain task The pain task was used to assess affective empathy
for pain (Jackson et al. 2005). Empathy for pain scores were
calculated by averaging the responses given on the VAS (0 (no
pain)–10 (worse pain ever)) for neutral and painful images for
the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests (see
Supplementary Material for descriptive statistics).
In order to examine the effects of the alcohol intervention on
these behavioural measures of affective empathy, separate
three-way mixed ANOVAs were performed for the facial task
and pain task. If behavioural measures of affective empathy
(valence towards faces or pain responses) were affected by
alcohol consumption, secondary analyses were performed to
determine whether these changes affected moral decision-
making. For the facial task, changes in valence were calculat-
ed by taking the difference between mean valence scores for
each facial expression between the pre- and post-intervention
tests. Prior to calculating change scores and to account for
baseline differences, a one-way ANOVA found no differences
between valence scores for each facial expression between
conditions in the pre-intervention test (ps > .289). For the pain
task, changes inmean empathy for pain scores were calculated
in the same way by taking the difference between VAS scores
for both image types (neutral; painful) between the pre- and
post-intervention. There were no differences between VAS
scores for both image types between conditions in the pre-
intervention test (ps > .642). The relationship between these
change scores and moral actions and moral judgments was
subsequently analysed using point-biserial correlations. In a
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final analysis of these behavioural measures of affective em-
pathy and in order to determine if these behavioural assess-
ments of affective empathy were related to self-report mea-
sures of affective empathy, psychopathy, and associated traits,
bivariate correlations were performed between traits and self-
reported valence to facial emotions collected in the pre-
intervention test and between traits and self-reported re-
sponses to neutral and painful images collected in the pre-
intervention test, prior to the alcohol intervention. This was
done to validate the behavioural measures of affective empa-
thy included here as in previous research (Wai and Tiliopoulos
2012). The post-intervention behavioural measures of affec-
tive empathy were not included in this analysis given the
potential mediating effects of alcohol consumption on online
performances in these tasks.
Results
Control variables and checks
BAC levels were significantly different between all condi-
tions, (F(2, 45) = 51.97, p < .001, ηp
2 = .70), with average
peak BAC levels (%) highest in the high alcohol condition
(M = 0.03%, SD = 0.01, Range = 0.01–0.05%), moderate in
the low alcohol condition (M = 0.01%, SD = 0.01, Range =
0–0.03%), and as expected, absent in the placebo condition.
Reported awareness of condition assignment was not associ-
ated with either moral actions or moral judgments (ps > .388).
Across conditions, there were no differences in self-reported
drinking habits (p = .328) and drinking habits did not correlate
with peak BAC level (p = .975). With previous research sug-
gesting that the relationship between alcohol and moral
decision-making may be influenced by feelings of disinhibi-
tion or positive affect (Duke and Begue 2015), subjective
mood ratings (disinhibition; positive affect) were compared
before and after the alcohol intervention. Analysis revealed
that self-reported disinhibition was not different between con-
ditions (p = .740) or following the intervention (p = .938).
Positive affect was significantly lower after the intervention,
(F(1, 45) = 9.18, p = .004, d = 0.32) but was not associated
with either moral actions (p = .673) or moral judgments (p-
s > .175). Following these checks, awareness checks, drinking
habits, and subjective mood were not included in further anal-
yses (for full details regarding analyses of control variables
and checks, see Supplementary Material).
Moral responses
Across alcohol and placebo conditions, the proportion of util-
itarian responses was higher when simulated action was re-
quired in virtual reality compared with when judgment was
required in the text-based counterpart (see Table 1).
GEE analyses were performed using a binary logistic mod-
el with task (judgment task; action task) as within-subjects
factor and condition (placebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as
between-subjects factor (see Fig. 5). When referencing the
morality question, analysis revealed a main effect of task,
(Wald X2[1] = 27.18, p < .001, h = − 1.15), with a greater pro-
portion of utilitarian responses overall in action tasks com-
pared with judgment tasks. There was no main effect of con-
dition (p = .470) and no interaction (p = .566). When
referencing the behavioural question, analysis revealed a main
effect of task, (Wald X2[1] = 24.90, p < .001, h = − 1.27), with
a greater proportion of utilitarian responses overall in action
tasks compared with judgment tasks. There was no main ef-
fect of condition (p = .286) and no interaction (p = .480).11
Following statistical analyses adopted in previous research
(Duke and Begue 2015), analyses were also carried out using
BAC level as a predictor of moral responses (non-utilitarian;
utilitarian) in both the moral action task and moral judgment
task. Peak BAC level was not a significant predictor of moral
responses in the virtual moral action task (p = .575) or the
moral judgment task when referencing both the morality and
behavioural question (ps > .109).
Heart rate responses Mean heart rate change was highest for
the moral action task (virtual footbridge dilemma) across con-
ditions. Heart rate change decreased for the moral judgment
task (text counterpart dilemma) and both the action and judg-
ment non-moral tasks.
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on heart rate changes
with task (judgment task; action task) and type (non-moral
task; moral task) as within-subjects factors and condition (pla-
cebo; low alcohol; high alcohol) as the between-subjects fac-
tor. Analysis revealed a main effect of task, (F(1, 45) = 23.12,
p < .001), a main effect of type, (F(1, 45) = 20.70, p < .001),
and a significant interaction of type × task, (F(1, 45) = 5.92,
p = .019) (see Fig. 6). There was no main effect of condition
(p = .436) and no further interactions (ps > .320).
To further investigate the interaction of type × task, simple
effects analyses were performed comparing heart rate changes
in non-moral and moral tasks within both judgment and action
tasks. A significant difference was found between non-moral
and moral tasks in the judgment task across groups, (F(1,
45) = 8.11, p = .007, d = − 0.63) and in the action task across
groups, (F(1, 45) = 14.53, p < .001, d = − 0.80) with greater
heart rate changes observed in moral tasks. There was a
11 In order to determine if there were differences in responses to questions, an
additional GEE analysis incorporating both themorality and behavioural ques-
tions revealed a main effect of task (Wald X2[1] = 36.28, p < .001), with a
greater proportion of utilitarian responses overall in the action task as com-
pared with both questions in the judgment task (ps < .001) but no difference
between moral responses to the morality question and behavioural question
(p = 1.00). There was no main effect of condition (p = .229) and no interaction
(p = .466).
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significant difference in heart rate change between the judg-
ment and action task but for the moral tasks only, (F(1, 45) =
17.21, p < .001, d = − 0.76) with greater heart rate changes
observed overall in the virtual moral action task. Heart rate
change for the non-moral tasks was not significantly different
between action and judgment tasks (p = .129).
In further analyses accounting for variation in alcohol ab-
sorption, bivariate correlations were carried out to determine
whether heart rate change in tasks was associated with peak
BAC levels. BAC levels were not correlated with heart rate
change in the moral judgment task (p = .789) or the judgment
and action non-moral tasks (ps > .536). Peak BAC level had a
moderate negative correlation with heart rate change in the
moral action task, (r(46) = − .37, p = .009) (see Fig. 7) and
when entered into a univariate linear regression, was found
to explain 13.8% of the variance in the model, (R2 = .138, F(1,
46) = 7.36, p = .009) when predicting this heart rate change
(β = − .37, p = .009).
Behavioural measures of affective empathy
Valence and alcohol A three-way mixed ANOVA was per-
formed to determine the effects of condition (placebo; low
alcohol; high alcohol), emotion (neutral; happy; sad), and test
(pre-intervention; post-intervention) on self-reported valence
to faces. Analysis revealed a main effect of emotion, (F(2,
90) = 141.04, p < .001), a significant two-way interaction of
test × emotion, (F(2, 90) = 5.95, p = .004), and a statistically
significant three-way interaction between condition × test ×
emotion, (F(4, 90) = 6.03, p < .001). There was no main effect
of test (p = .195) or condition (p = .990) and no further inter-
actions (ps > .463).
Table 1 Percentage of utilitarian
responses in moral judgment and
action tasks
Moral judgment task Moral action task
Condition Morality question Behavioural question
Placebo 25% 25% 75%
Low alcohol 18.75% 6.25% 68.75%
High alcohol 6.25% 6.25% 68.75%
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Fig. 5 Utilitarian responses (%) in the moral action task (virtual
footbridge) and the moral judgment task (text-based footbridge
counterpart) in the placebo, low alcohol, and high alcohol conditions. In
the judgment task, participants were asked whether the action was mor-
ally acceptable and whether they would do it. A greater number of utili-
tarian outcomes were endorsed in the moral action task (Although GEE
analyses revealed no significant response differences between conditions,
the differences between conditions in their responses to the judgment task
appeared to be large (e.g. 6.25% versus 25% utilitarian responses). As
such, we carried out additional separate chi-square tests comparing re-
sponses to the morality question and the behavioural question between
conditions. These supported GEE analyses showing no significant differ-
ences between conditions in their moral judgments made in response to
either themorality question (p = .492) or behavioural question (p = .333)).
Error bars represent ± 1 SEp.
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In order to examine the higher-order interaction further,
simple effects tests follow. Statistical significance of simple
two-way interactions and follow-up simple main effects were
accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted level (p = .017). Analysis
revealed a statistically significant two-way interaction of test
× emotion in the high alcohol condition, (F(2, 30) = 21.21,
p < .001) (see Fig. 8c) but not in the placebo (p = .665) (see
Fig. 8a) or low alcohol conditions (p = .933) (see Fig. 8b). In
order to investigate this interaction further, the effect of test
(pre-intervention; post-intervention) was examined for each
emotion (neutral; happy; sad) using simple effects tests.
There was a statistically significant simple main effect of test
for the high alcohol condition in reported valence to happy
faces and sad faces but not in valence towards neutral faces
(p = .309). For participants in the high alcohol condition, va-
lence towards happy faces was significantly lower (more neg-
ative) in the post-test after alcohol consumption, (t(15) = 5.18,
p < .001, d = 1.29) and valence towards sad faces was signif-
icantly higher (more positive) in the post-test after alcohol
consumption, (t(15) = − 3.46, p = .003, d = − 0.87) (see
Fig. 8c).
Empathy for pain and alcohol A three-way mixed ANOVA
was performed to determine the effects of condition (placebo;
low alcohol; high alcohol), image type (neutral; painful), and
test (pre-intervention; post-intervention) on VAS scores
assessing empathy for pain. Analysis revealed a significant
main effect of image type, (F(1, 45) = 1221.51, p < .001),
and a significant two-way interaction of test × image type,
(F(1, 45) = 9.23, p = .004). There was no main effect of test
(p = .056), no main effect of condition (p = .835), and no fur-
ther interactions (ps > .500).
To further investigate the interaction between test × image
type, simple effects analyses were performed comparing em-
pathy for pain scores for neutral and painful images within
both the pre-intervention and post-intervention tests. A signif-
icant difference was found between pain scores for neutral and
painful images in both the pre-test (F(1, 45) = 1031.75,
p < .001, d = − 5.35) and post-test (F(1, 45) = 943.13,
p < .001, d = − 5.38) with painful images eliciting higher
VAS scores overall. In the post-test, empathy for pain scores
in response to neutral images was significantly lower com-
pared with the pre-test, (F(1, 45) = 14.52, p < .001, d = 0.51)
(see Fig. 9).
Affective empathy andmoral responses Following the finding
that valence towards sad and happy faces was affected by
alcohol consumption, a point-biserial correlational analysis
was performed revealing that changes in self-reported valence
towards happy and sad faces between the pre- and post-
intervention tests were not associated with moral actions (p-
s > .651) or moral judgments (ps > .372). Given the test ×
emotion × condition interaction, partial correlations control-
ling for BAC levels were also performed revealing no rela-
tionship between changes in self-reported valence towards
happy and sad faces and moral responses (ps > .132).
Changes in empathy for pain scores between the pre- and
post-interventions for neutral and painful images were not
associated with either moral actions (ps > .114) or moral judg-
ments (ps > .344).
Affective empathy and traits Moderate correlations showed
that individuals scoring higher in primary psychopathy felt
more positively when looking at sad facial expressions,
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Fig. 6 Mean heart rate change
(bpm) for non-moral and moral
task type in judgment and action
tasks by condition. Increased
heart rate changes were observed
in the virtual moral action task
across conditions. Error bars
represent ± 1 SE
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(r(46) = .39, p = .007) and more negatively when looking at
happy facial expressions, (r(46) = − .34, p = .017). Honesty-
Humility, on the other hand, correlated negatively with va-
lence towards sad facial expressions, (r(46) = − .47, p = .001)
and positively with valence towards happy facial expressions,
(r(46) = .35, p = .015). Additionally, individuals scoring
higher in Internalisation felt more positively towards happy
facial expressions, (r(46) = .29, p = .048) and individuals with
higher Empathic Concern scores reported feeling more nega-
tive towards sad facial expressions, (r(46) = − .30, p = .037)
(see Supplementary Material for table of trait correlations).
Moderate correlations revealed that individuals scoring
higher in primary psychopathy had lower empathy for pain
scores when looking at painful images, (r(46) = − .35,
p = .016). Empathic Concern, on the other hand, correlated
positively with empathy for pain scores on the VAS in re-
sponse to painful images, (r(46) = .31, p = .03). Individuals
scoring higher in Honesty-Humility reported greater empathy
for pain scores when looking at neutral images, (r(46) = .32,
p = .025) (see Supplementary Material for table of trait
correlations).
General discussion
Overall, greater utilitarian endorsements were observed when
simulated action was required in virtual reality, compared
with when moral judgments were required in a text-based
counterpart dilemma. Whilst alcohol consumption altered
self-reported performances in behavioural measures of affec-
tive empathy and heart rate responses in the virtual moral
dilemma, in the present study, alcohol intake did not affect
moral actions or moral judgments. These results contrast with
previous findings investigating acute alcohol effects on moral
decision-making.
Moral actions versus judgments
Participants in the present experiment demonstrated moral in-
consistency; greater utilitarian actions were observed in the
virtual footbridge dilemma, with fewer utilitarian judgments
observed in the text-based counterpart, regardless of condition
assignment. These results corroborate existing virtual research
that demonstrates disparity between saying and doing (e.g.
Francis et al. 2016; Francis et al. 2017b; Francis et al.
2017a; McDonald et al. 2017; Patil et al. 2014). In previous
virtual research, the preference for simulating characteristical-
ly utilitarian actions in virtual reality has been interpreted
through two accounts. Frame of reference accounts theorise
that egocentric perspectives and subsequent self-interested
motives drive moral actions as individuals consider the self-
relevant consequences of their own actions (Francis et al.
2017b; Tassy et al. 2013a; Tassy et al. 2013b). Judgments,
on the other hand, are theorised to rely on allocentric evalua-
tions and subsequently, cultural norms (Tassy et al. 2013a;
Tassy et al. 2013b). Contextual saliency accounts argue that
the physical features in virtual scenarios allow individuals to
‘see’ potential victims in a moral dilemma, and this then re-
sults in greater negative emphasis being placed on witnessing
victims die than on performing harmful actions (Francis et al.
2016; Francis et al. 2017b; Patil et al. 2014).
With regard to the alcohol intervention in the present ex-
periment, we had hypothesised alternative outcomes based on
divergent streams of research seeking to understand the roles
of deliberation versus social processing in moral decision-
making (e.g. Duke and Begue 2015; Greene et al. 2001;
Patil 2015). Based on a deliberation-focused hypothesis, with
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alcohol increasing emotional reactivity and decreasing cogni-
tive functioning, non-utilitarian preferences would be predict-
ed (Greene et al. 2001). Alternatively, previous research has
argued that alcohol intake results in deficits in social process-
ing but more specifically, reduced aversion to harm, subse-
quently resulting in an increase in utilitarian moral judgments
(Duke and Begue 2015).
In terms of moral actions, we outlined similar divergent
hypotheses. If dual process theories of moral judgment
(Greene et al. 2001) transfer to the domain of moral action
(Navarrete et al. 2012), the deliberation hypothesis might also
transfer to moral actions, resulting in fewer utilitarian endorse-
ments. However, given evidence that moral action and judg-
ment are partially distinct (e.g. Tassy et al. 2013b) and that
moral inconsistency is often present in populations with social
deficits (e.g. Cima et al. 2010; Patil 2015), there could be a
preference for greater utilitarian actions after alcohol con-
sumption following the social processing hypothesis.
However, in the present experiment, neither moral judgments
nor moral actions were affected by alcohol consumption. As
such, these results cannot provide support for either the social
processing hypothesis (Duke and Begue 2015) or the
deliberation-based hypothesis (Greene et al. 2001).
Alcohol and arousal
Supporting previous findings, heart rate changes were highest
for virtual reality moral tasks across conditions (e.g. Francis
et al. 2016). When taking BAC levels into account, increased
BAC levels were associated with reduced arousal responses in
the virtual reality moral task only. This supports the theory that
virtual reality paradigms can prompt realistic physiological
responses (e.g. Parsons 2015) and the theory that alcohol
may trigger affective processing deficits in emotionally aver-
sive situations (Duke and Begue 2015).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Neutral Happy Sad
Av
er
ag
e 
Va
le
nc
e 
Facial Expression
b  Low Alcohol Pre-intervenon
Post-intervenon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Neutral Happy Sad
Av
er
ag
e 
Va
le
nc
e
Facial Expression
a  Placebo Pre-intervenonPost-intervenon
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Neutral Happy Sad
Av
er
ag
e 
Va
le
nc
e
Facial Expression
c  High Alcohol Pre-intervenon
Post-intervenon
p <.001
p =.003
Fig. 8 Simple interaction effects showing average self-reported valence
to facial expressions (1 (negative)–9 (positive)) in the (a) placebo condi-
tion, (b) low alcohol condition, and (c) high alcohol condition. A signif-
icant interaction effect was found for the high alcohol condition and for
happy and sad facial expressions only. This interaction can be seen in the
different slopes of the pre-intervention (dotted line) and post-intervention
(solid line) valence in the (c) high alcohol condition. Error bars represent
± 1 SE
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Empathy and psychopathy
Pre-intervention behavioural affective empathy tasks were
validated against existing personality trait assessments.
Replicating previous research (Ali et al. 2009; Wai and
Tiliopoulos 2012), primary psychopathy was negatively asso-
ciated with self-reported valence towards positive faces and
positively related to self-reported valence towards negative
faces. Wai and Tiliopoulos (2012) argue that the presentation
of facial displays of emotion using the SAM (Bradley and
Lang 1994) may provide a more accurate measure of affective
empathy than trait questionnaires. They argue that picturing
another’s emotions generates an emotional contagion.
Subsequently, the way in which an individual then feels (neg-
atively or positively) about this display of emotion is an em-
pathic measure derived from the appropriateness of that reac-
tion (Wai and Tiliopoulos 2012). The finding that individuals
scoring high in primary psychopathy demonstrate ‘… inap-
propriate responding’ to sad and happy faces (Wai and
Tiliopoulos 2012, p. 797) reflects a deficit in this empathic
contagion. The present experiment also extends these find-
ings, having observed the opposite trend in individuals scor-
ing high in traits negatively correlated with the Dark Triad,
including Honesty-Humility, Empathic Concern, and
Internalisation. In these cases, emotional responses to facial
displays of emotion were appropriately aligned, with happy
faces motivating self-reported positive valence and sad faces
motivating negative valence.
We had also hypothesised that primary psychopathy would
negatively correlate with empathy for pain scores. This was
supported in the present findings; individuals scoring higher
in trait primary psychopathy demonstrated less intensity when
rating the pain of others. Extending from this, the inversely
related trait, Empathic Concern, was positively correlatedwith
empathy for pain. This aligns with previous research showing
that individuals scoring higher in Empathic Concern demon-
strate a high level of care and consideration for the welfare of
others (e.g. Davis 1983). Unexpectedly, Honesty-Humility
positively correlated with empathy for pain scores in neutral
images. There are a few explanations for this association.
Firstly, follow-up analysis revealed that empathy for pain
scores between neutral and painful images was positively cor-
related in the pre-intervention task, (r(46) = .37, p = .009) and
post-intervention task, (r(46) = .33, p = .022) suggesting that
similar mechanisms drive ratings of pain or anticipated pain in
neutral images. Secondly, higher Honesty-Humility has been
associated with lower health- and safety-related risk-taking
(Weller and Tikir 2011) which, in this instance, may have
intensified the anticipation of harmful outcomes pictured in
neutral images.
Alcohol and empathy
Given that alcohol is thought to diminish aversion for harm
and hinder social processing (e.g. Carmona-Perera et al. 2014;
Duke and Begue 2015), we hypothesised that alcohol con-
sumption would impair performance in the SAM as a result
of these social impairments. This was supported in the present
experiment; individuals receiving a high dosage of alcohol
reported feeling more positively towards sad faces and more
negatively towards happy faces in the post-intervention facial
SAM task. These inappropriate responses reflect those of in-
dividuals scoring high in primary psychopathy (Wai and
Tiliopoulos 2012) and support the theory that alcohol impairs
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Fig. 9 Bar graphs showing average empathy for pain scores on the VAS
(0 (no pain)–10 (worse pain ever) in response to (a) neutral images and
(b) painful images. A significant interaction effect revealed higher VAS
scores for painful images across pre- and post-intervention tests and sig-
nificantly lower VAS scores for neutral images in the post-test. This
interaction can be seen in the different slopes of the VAS scores for
painful images versus neutral images and in the different slopes of the
pre-intervention (dotted line) and post-intervention (solid line) VAS
scores in the (a) neutral images. Error bars represent ± 1 SE
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components of affective empathy (Duke and Begue 2015).
These results are in line with the finding that affective empa-
thy is principally impaired in alcohol-dependent individuals
(Maurage et al. 2011; Marinkovic et al. 2009) and addicted
patients (e.g. Ferrari et al. 2014). However, in terms of moral
responses, differences in the pre- and post-intervention facial
behavioural measures of affective empathy did not relate to
either moral actions or moral judgments when controlling for
alcohol consumption. Despite supporting the association be-
tween alcohol and impairment of affective empathy (Duke
and Begue 2015), this impairment did not result in utilitarian
decision-making, as the social processing hypothesis would
predict.
Further, given evidence that harm aversion plays a mediat-
ing role in personality traits associated with making suppos-
edly utilitarian endorsements (Patil 2015), evidence for the
role of these traits in moral inconsistency (Cima et al. 2010),
and the theory that alcohol reduces harm aversion (Duke and
Begue 2015), we had predicted that alcohol consumption
would reduce affective empathy towards individuals in pain-
ful circumstances. However, alcohol dosage did not affect
empathy for pain scores in the present experiment. This sup-
ports existing research findings that pain intensity ratings are
not affected by acute alcohol consumption despite empathic
neural activity for pain being reduced (Hu et al. 2017).
Empathy for pain scores for neutral images was significantly
lower following the intervention across all conditions regard-
less of alcohol intake but it is likely that this finding reflects a
familiarity effect as individuals became aware of the distinc-
tion between painful and neutral images in the present
investigation.
Alcohol, empathy, and utilitarianism
It is important to raise an alternative interpretation, based on
the present experiment’s findings, to the proposed association
between affective empathy and utilitarian moral decision-
making. Previous research has identified evidence of a rela-
tionship between anti-social traits, and simulated moral ac-
tions (Francis et al. 2016) and the power of these simulated
actions (Francis et al. 2017b). We expanded these investiga-
tions using behavioural assessments of affective empathy giv-
en evidence that the relationship between psychopathy and
utilitarian decision-making derives from empathic deficits
(e.g. Glenn et al. 2009) and subsequent diminished aversion
to performing harmful actions (e.g. Patil 2015).
However, in the present experiment, affective empathy was
successfully manipulated in a facial responding task following
alcohol consumption, but this did not affect moral decision-
making. This may suggest that is not only the un-empathic
facets of traits such as psychopathy that drive utilitarian moral
decision-making but perhaps other facets. For example, psy-
chopaths have been found to demonstrate low anxiety and
fearlessness (e.g. Miller et al. 2008) which might instead ex-
plain their diminished aversion to harm and tendency to re-
spond in a utilitarian manner. Indeed, Koenigs et al. 2012
found that low-anxious psychopaths (with inhibitory deficits)
endorsed a greater proportion of utilitarian moral judgments in
personal moral dilemmas when compared with high-anxious
psychopaths and this relationship has also been evidenced in
psychopharmacological investigations in which anti-anxiety
drugs (Lorazepam) have reduced harm aversion and subse-
quently resulted in greater utilitarian endorsements (Perkins
et al. 2013). The low anxious facets of primary psychopathy
are theorised to reflect emotional and inhibitory deficits
(Koenigs et al. 2012) that compromise conditionability of
moral norms (Blair 1995) and subsequently reduce aversion
to harm. For example, when facing a punishment following a
transgression, we feel anxious, and this subsequently condi-
tions us to avoid future transgressions. A diminished anxiety
response is thought to compromise this conditioned response
(e.g. Blair 1995). Again, evidence in this area has been mixed
(e.g. Schmitt and Newman 1999; Visser et al. 2012) with
research also highlighting the moderating role of aggression,
rather than trait anxiety, in this relationship (Choe and Min
2011; Gao and Tang 2013). In the present investigation, we
did not include measures of anxiety or aggression and so this
theory remains speculative. However, with research suggest-
ing a critical role for these facets in action aversion deficits,
future research should consider incorporating these assess-
ments in both moral judgment and moral action paradigms.
It should also be noted that the relationship between acute
alcohol effects and utilitarian moral decision-making found in
previous research (Duke and Begue 2015) may also derive
from social awareness or social influence. Duke and Begue
(2015) collected moral judgments made in response to the
footbridge dilemma in bars. These social settings may have
influenced moral judgments in a number of ways. Firstly, the
disinhibited atmosphere may have made the perception of
hypothetical trolley problems less serious, with previous re-
search suggesting that these scenarios can be perceived as
humorous (e.g. Bauman et al. 2014). Alternatively, social
pressures may have resulted in individuals acting in a way that
they felt was publicly acceptable under social expectation (e.g.
Gold et al. 2015). As such, future research examining the
acute effects of alcohol intake on moral decision-making
might consider including control measures such as social de-
sirability and self-awareness scales.
Moral inconsistency
Whilst the within-subjects design of the present experiment
allowed a direct comparison between moral judgments and
moral actions made by the same individual (Patil et al.
2014), it might be argued that the comparison of moral judg-
ments and moral actions is limited, given that each paradigm
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incorporated a different hypothetical moral dilemma. We
chose not to include the footbridge dilemma in both the
virtual- and text-based tasks to remove any potential carry-
over effects (Bartels et al. 2015). Importantly, in previous
validation studies (see Francis et al. 2017a), we did not find
a significant difference between responses to the footbridge
dilemma and the modified dilemma, suggesting that it could
be utilised as a reliable comparable dilemma. Further, no order
effects were found based on the presentation of moral judg-
ment and action tasks, suggesting that utilising different di-
lemmas did prevent potential carry-over effects.
Methodological considerations
It is also important to highlight limitations of the present meth-
odology. Firstly, no measure of cognitive functioning or exec-
utive functioning was included in the present experiment, a
criticism mirroring that of previous research (Duke and Begue
2015). This is significant given the mediating effect of exec-
utive functioning in the relationship between alcohol and ag-
gression (e.g. Giancola 2000, 2004; Godlaski and Giancola
2009) and alcohol-related aggression and affective empathy
(Giancola 2003). As such, it was difficult to determine the
extent to which the present dosages of alcohol affected exec-
utive functioning and the subsequent effects of this on moral
decision-making. Future research should consider exploring
the acute effects of alcohol in both social processing and ex-
ecutive function-based tasks.
Secondly, the order of tasks following the intervention may
influence results. The moral judgment and moral action tasks
preceded the post-intervention affective empathy tasks. This
decision was made to ensure that moral judgment and moral
action tasks were completed during the window of peak BAC
level. However, it might be that completing moral decision-
making tasks first subsequently influenced the outcome in the
empathy tasks. Consequently, future research should consider
counterbalancing the order of these tasks to control for possi-
ble carry-over effects.
Importantly, the design of the present experiment, in terms
of sample size and alcohol dosing, was based on previous
research (Duke and Begue 2015). Whilst the average peak
BAC levels recorded here were similar to the average record-
ed by Duke and Begue (2015), the range of BAC levels was
smaller in the present investigation as a result of incorporating
controlled dosages. Future research might consider incorpo-
rating higher dosages of alcohol that would extend these find-
ings to the upper limits of the BAC level ranges reported in
Duke and Begue’s field studies (0.05–0.16%). It is also im-
portant to note that sample sizes in the present study were
based on Duke and Begue’s field studies and given that this
investigation extends these original field studies by including
additional measures in a mixed model experimental design,
power may be affected. Future research should consider
extending the present work to larger and more diverse sample
populations. Further, given that previous research has reported
mixed findings regarding gender differences in ethanol meta-
bolic rates and subsequent blood alcohol levels (e.g. Frezza
et al. 1990; Thomasson 2002) and that there has been evidence
supporting gender differences in subjective ratings of facial
displays of emotion (e.g. Lang et al. 1993; Montagne et al.
2005) and neural mechanisms underlying the processing of
the pain of others (e.g. Han et al. 2008), future research should
investigate the interaction effects of gender differences on
acute alcohol effects on affective empathy and moral deci-
sion-making. Gender effects were not initially examined here
as the gender composition of each group did not allow such a
comparative analysis (however following suggestions from an
anonymous reviewer, see Supplementary Material for post
hoc analyses controlling for gender).
Following from these methodological considerations, it is
also important to consider the roles of dispositional traits and
behavioural states in the current discussion. Dispositional
traits are thought to reflect core personality profiles (e.g.
Haslam et al. 2004), with moral traits playing an important
role in shaping our personal identity (Strohminger and
Nichols 2014). Arguably and following from this, it is unlike-
ly that the small to moderate dosages of alcohol in the present
experiment would alter core moral principles shaped by social
and moral norms, despite influencing behavioural and state-
dependent measures of affective empathy and social process-
ing (Duke and Begue 2015). Investigations should advance
beyond the manipulation of state-dependent empathic pro-
cessing and investigate moral judgments and simulated moral
actions in populations in which there are likely to be distinct
dispositional trait profiles. It is also important to highlight a
limitation of incorporating relative measures of moral judg-
ment, which assert that utilitarian and non-utilitarian (or deon-
tological) motivations operate inversely (Patil 2015). Process
dissociation approaches have revealed that moral ideologies
guide moral judgments independently (Conway and
Gawronski 2013; Conway et al. 2018) and as such, relative
measures may fail to detect both utilitarian and deontological
inclinations. Whether this process dissociation translates to
moral actions requires further investigation but future work
should expand these investigations to examine whether alco-
hol consumption, and subsequent changes in social process-
ing, results in varying levels of both utilitarian and deontolog-
ical inclinations in moral decision-making.
Conclusion
Given the theory that increased utilitarian endorsements are
driven by diminished affective empathy (e.g. Duke and Begue
2015) and aversion to harm (e.g. Patil 2015), we examined
these components specifically in the present experiment,
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revealing a complex picture. Consuming alcohol at higher
dosages did reduce affective empathy in a facial responding
task, but this did not alter moral decision-making; moral ac-
tions continued to be dominated by utilitarian responses and
moral judgments primarily comprised non-utilitarian re-
sponses. Given that the sample used in this investigation
was predominately female and sampled from a student popu-
lation, we do not attempt to make broad generalisations given
sample representativeness. The outcomes of the present inves-
tigation might suggest that facets beyond or in addition to
deficits in affective empathy influence the relationship be-
tween alcohol consumption and utilitarian endorsements
(Duke and Begue 2015) and psychopathic traits and utilitarian
endorsements (e.g. Francis et al. 2016; Francis et al. 2017b).
Future research should consider expanding the present inves-
tigation in order to determine if these effects generalise more
broadly.
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